ENL 10A: “Rebirth in Passion: The Fall of Othello and Iago”

Jolene Patricia Brown

ENL 10A

3 Nov 2009

Rebirth in Passion: The Fall of Othello and Iago

Othello is a tragedy of words. The sins committed by the various players are of ignorance, hardly deserving of the outcome of death and destruction at the end of the play, especially those of Othello and Desdemona. Their folly was not communicating with one another as a married couple should: not discussing the strange stories of Iago and thereby not discovering, before it was too late, that much of what they believed to be true was nothing more than hints of lies construed as truth. The echoing of Iago and Othello in act IV.i leads to both a convergence between Othello and Iago, and is a turning point in the play ultimately leading to Othello’s trance and the rebirth of both characters into passionate, revenge-induced rage.

The trance is the rebirth of both Othello and Iago within the play; it is what begins the fall of both characters and is a point of no return. Othello comes under Iago’s hypnosis and awakes to find himself in chaos, away from reason and love; embroiled in passion and hate. As a soldier, this is a dangerous place for Othello because his first instincts after the trance are for revenge on Desdemona and Cassio, which he acts on without rational consideration. His loyalties change after this convergence and rebirth as well, as Othello has performed an almost ritualistic ceremony of loyalty to Iago, comparable to a wedding, and Desdemona is no longer Othello’s “love” as it is now pledged to Iago. Iago is also reborn while Othello is in the trance: instead of only plotting against Othello, he begins to imagine revenge on Cassio by assisting Othello in his plans for Cassio’s death, and later the death of Roderigo. With all those out of his way, regardless of where that leaves him, Iago believes he will “win” and he also becomes overruled by his passionate desire for revenge.

Iago, it seems, did not originally plan to bring Othello down through Desdemona’s supposed infidelity. At the opening of the play his intentions are unclear and all the reader understands is that Iago hates Othello because Iago was passed over by Cassio for a lieutenant position. Originally, Iago’s plans only intended to embarrass, and hurt, Othello by denying him access to Desdemona. It is not until Brabantio warns Othello of Desdemona’s questionable decision to betray her own father that Iago realizes what might be the best way to hurt Othello: “Look to her, Moor, if thou hast eyes to see: / She has deceived her father, and may thee” (I.iii.290-291). These words from Desdemona’s father are ominous, especially when compared to Desdemona’s own words about her loyalty to her father:

My noble father,
I do perceive here a divided duty…
…you are the lord of duty;
I am hitherto your daughter. But here’s my husband;
And so much duty as my mother showed
To you, preferring you before her father,
So much I challenge that I my profess
Due to the Moor my lord. (I.iii.178-179, 182-187)

In her own words, Desdemona declares her loyalty divided between her father, to whom she owes for her “life and education,” and her husband. Though she ultimately chooses loyalty to Othello in marrying him without her father’s consent, by doing so she leaves her loyalty open to doubt and implies that her loyalty to Othello may ultimately waver. Iago most likely overhears Brabantio’s comment to Othello and it can be argued that it is this comment that sets off his plan of action to turn Othello against Desdemona through the use of suggestion. After all, if Desdemona had both loyalties to her father and to her love for Othello she would have attempted to work out the marriage through her father to show respect for both men. Instead, by pursuing it through subversive means, her loyalty comes into question and Iago will use this doubt against Othello throughout the rest of the play.

The idea planted in Othello’s mind by Brabantio festers in his subconscious as Iago subtly attempts to remind him of it. In act III.iii we witness the one of the first instances of echoing between Iago and Othello:

Othello: What dost thou think?

Iago: Think, my lord?

Othello: “Think, my lord?” By heaven, thou echo’st me

As if there were some monster in thy thought
Too hideous to be shown…
As if thou then hadst shut up in thy brain
Some horrible conceit. If thou dost love me,
Show me thy thought.

Iago: My lord, you know I love you. (III.iii.107-111, 116-119)

This conversation is where Iago finally breaches Othello’s secret fear and, taking advantage of it leads Othello to question Desdemona’s loyalty. At this point Iago is only leading Othello to doubt, and Othello supplies him with the ideas he needs only to affirm for him: Iago is hinting at a source of doubt and Othello is allowing himself to be manipulated. Though Othello is speaking to Iago in this passage when he wonders about the “monster” in Iago’s thought, it might be said that the “monster” is in fact Othello’s; he is really speaking to himself. Iago has successfully brought the “monster” of thought to the forefront of Othello’s mind and now he only needs to supply the evidence to drive Othello to chaos.

Throughout the story Iago uses subtle suggestion and echoes to bring Othello under his spell of lies. After Othello falls into the trance, Iago muses at his success: “Work on, / My medicine works! Thus credulous fools are caught, / and many worthy and chaste dames even thus, / All guiltless, meet reproach” (IV.i.45-46). Iago administers his words to Othello constantly throughout the play but never so directly that they might be called “lies.” Much of what he says hints at wrongdoing and infidelity, which only prompt Othello to consider them and at first Othello does not realize what is being implied. The idea is there, however, planted by Desdemona’s father, and Iago must only keep that thought at the forefront of Othello’s mind for him to become more serious about the implications of her behavior. Iago begins the play by plotting an attempt at “revenge” that he’s not even sure how he can carry out. By Act V, however, Iago has become a villain in the larger sense as he becomes enveloped in a depraved realization that regardless of who dies, he still wins: “Now, whether he [Roderigo] kill Cassio / Or Cassio him, or each do kill the other, / Every way makes my gain” (V.i.12-14). Othello’s trance is also a rebirth for Iago as he broadens the scope of his plans from revenge on only Othello to take revenge on Cassio and even Roderigo. His decision becomes one of multiple revenge and he is no longer only a minor villain and instead sees the death of all those who wronged him as a way of winning no matter what.

Othello’s trance is also his rebirth, but not one of innocence, as it strips him of his rational functions and places him in a world of chaos ruled by his passionate anger. When he awakens, he is under Iago’s control, whether he knows it or not. Iago already has what he wants at this point: the earlier convergence between Othello and Iago during act III.iv established Iago as Othello’s lieutenant:

[Othello]: …Come, go with me apart; I will withdraw
To furnish me with some swift means of death
For the fair devil. Now art thou my lieutenant.

Iago: I am your own forever.

Iago’s revenge would seem complete at this point except Iago continues what he has begun, consenting to kill Cassio as Othello swears he will kill Desdemona. Iago’s promotion is symbolic of Othello handing over control of his mind, and from that point forward Othello is only a shadow of his former self, and no longer has the beauty and dignity that he did before the trance.

The trance is the point of no return in the play as both Othello and Iago are no longer capable of ending the cycle of destruction that reader sees as the ultimate end. Unfortunately for Desdemona, she is an innocent victim of men who come under control of their passion for anger and jealousy. “Alas, what ignorant sin have I committed?” Desdemona asks of Othello in IV.ii.71 and indeed this question can be asked by all the players. An ignorant sin is one that the sinner does not realize they have committed; it is not innocent, but there is a sort of innocence involved in ignorance. Even Iago, it can be argued, committed ignorant sins for he could not have predicted the outcome of Othello becoming a passionate murder, or that Iago himself would turn on all those around him. Each step in the play escalates the players to a realm of hate, and each of them are ignorant of the outcome. The convergence, however, is a potential stopping point that Iago refuses to allow, and by the time Othello falls into a trance it is too late to stop.

ENL 164: "Kelvin and Jarry: The Rationale of Making Rationality Ultra-Rational"

Kelvin and Jarry:

The Rationale of Making Rationality Ultra-Rational.

In comparing Lord Kelvin’s writings to Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustroll ‘Pataphysician by Alfred Jarry, one immediately notices how Dr. Faustroll enacts the thoroughness of science so exactly, and so rigorously that his science of ‘pataphysics takes on characteristics of the absurd. At first it seems a strictly satirical jab at the ideas behind modern science, but there is an element of respect for the ideas put forth in the unusual discussions and integration of Kelvin’s theories into the science of ‘Pataphysics. Jarry analyzes Kelvin’s ideas and supplants them into a realm of the absurd by exploring them so rationally that the ideas become irrational. In leaving the serious scientific implications intact, Jarry performs rational observation so intense it becomes ultra-rational, thereby transitioning into the realm of the absurd by using the measure of science on itself. By doing so he calls into question the very grounds of scientific reasoning and measurement, and Jarry exposes the inherent irrationality of that which is supposed to be rational about science, calling into question those things which sciences, and Kelvin, hold as truth.

One instance of Jarry’s emphasis on the ultra-rational scientific analysis is Dr. Faustroll’s absurd observations in his ‘pataphysical studies. Doctor Faustroll’s first telepathic letter to Lord Kelvin includes the observation that “The body is a more necessary vehicle because it supports one’s clothes, and through clothes one’s pockets” (247). In science it is the human body that is studied, but Dr. Faustroll sees the body only as a vehicle for the pockets in one’s clothes, without which one would not be capable of carrying their “centimeter” or measuring tool. This over-analysis of the purpose of closing takes the focus off of the human body and places it on the clothing merely for its usefulness is carrying a scientific tool. Clothing, an inorganic, senseless object, takes on usefulness not allowed by the limitations of the human body, the source of physical senses. Though the body is important, it is subservient to the clothing, as a “more necessary vehicle” but only a vehicle, nonetheless.

The body becomes a secondary concept to the ‘pataphysician, as Faustroll divorces the senses from the body when he dies, and is then “initiated into the science of all things…have reconquered all perception” (250). For Faustroll, the body is separate from the mind; death, which is understood as a cessation of physical sense, cannot stop him from his experimentation. The senses, at least in some form, are available to him after the death of his body, so it is perfectly reasonable for him to achieve ‘pataphysical understanding without the use of his earth-bound body. In contrast, Kelvin does not differentiate between the body and the senses, instead emphasizing the integration of the senses with the body and the mind when he states: “Now if I were to say that the weight of that piece of chalk is the fourth power of twenty miles an hour, I would be considered fit, not for this place, but for a place where people who have lost their sense are taken care of” (Brown 3). This ties together the body, mind and senses by pointing out that if the mind conceives of this absurd thought, and the body voices that thought as a serious consideration, then a body will put into a place where others “who have lost their sense” are taken. Kelvin also defines for the reader his stance on sanity, for those who are without sense consideration lack the ability to care for themselves, and thus must be institutionalized.

When Faustroll dies he expresses unhappiness at being separated from his ‘pataphysical tools when he telepathically writes: “I no longer had even my tuning fork. Imagine the perplexity of a man outside time and space, who has lost his watch, and his measuring rod, and his turning fork. I believe, Sir, that it is indeed this state which constitutes death” (248). Without his tools for measurement the scientist can no longer draw comparisons between two events, but a ‘pataphysician would hardly need the same tools for measurement in their studies that are similar to those of a scientist. However, without these measuring tools Faustroll is reduced a state that is similar to death, but contradictorily, he is making this comparison while in a state of death, so he is still making measurements of some kind. Death, as Faustroll explains, “is only for common people” but who those people are he does not say, except that he immediately agrees with Kelvin that “if one can measure what one is talking about and express it in numbers, which constitute the sole reality, then one has some knowledge of one’s subject” (247). The common person, based on this description, is one who has no concept of measurement and quantification, and therefore no concept of—in Faustroll’s case—‘pataphysics.

Jarry proposes that ‘pataphysics “will examine the laws governing exceptions” which is in contrast to modern science. Jarry proposes that:

[‘Pataphysics]… will describe a universe which can be…envisaged in the place of the traditional one, since the laws that are supposed to have been discovered in the traditional universe are also correlations of exceptions, albeit more frequent ones, but in any case accidental data which, reduced to the status of unexceptional exceptions, possess no longer even the virtue of originality. (192-193)

‘Pataphysics is content to examine each event on its own, and instead of attempting to correlate each event with others, allows them to be individual occurrences or objects. In this way, ‘pataphysics shows more consideration to the smallest details, analyzing the differences that exist between otherwise identical events. Instead of focusing on the ample similarities, the scarce differences are studied exhaustively, until the point where it is considered absurd by science. Science ignores the exceptions as anomalies, instead choosing to look for patterns and grouping the similar events together in an attempt to construct knowledge of the world. Where there are gaps in perception induction is used to create a rational, perfectly explainable, picture of the world. Based on measurements, history, previous knowledge, and perceived similarities, events are then lumped into various categories based on the similarities of the identical or nearly identical. It devotes energy to the discovery of new correlations which are based on the similarities of events rather than differences.

Measurement is the source of all similarities and differences, and so is the foundation of all scientific knowledge. Kelvin explains the importance of measurement in science when he writes:

The first step toward numerical reckoning of properties of matter, more advanced than the mere reference to a set of numbered standards, as in mineralogists scale of hardness, or to an arbitrary trade standard…is the discovery of a continuously-varying action of some kind, and the means of observing it definitely, and meaning it in terms of some arbitrary unit or scale division. (Brown 1)

Through measurement the scientist can relate to the world, and without it there is no basis for the correlation and categorizing of seemingly similar, albeit isolated events. By measuring an object a direct comparison is being made between two different objects, even though the second object might be absent, like through the use of a meter stick. In this way, the source of measurement is often something completely arbitrary, based on another object completely unrelated to those being measured. For example, Kelvin confirms the origins of the meter when he states that “The metre…was made originally as nearly as possible equal to the ten-millionth of the length of a certain quadrant of the earth” (Brown 4). Thus, all objects that are given a length in meters are compared to an arbitrary piece of earth determined by scientists as a basis for all forms of length measurement.

Though it makes sense to have the ability to compare the lengths of two separate objects in terms of numbers, the source of the meter could be considered absurd. Jarry, however, formulates a super-rational form a measurement that Dr. Faustroll totes as his source of ‘pataphysical measurement: “I carry on me the one thousand millionth part of a quarter of the earth’s circumference, which is more honorable than being attached to the surface of the globe by attraction” (249). This form of measurement may seem absurd, but it is a rational idea when considered with the arbitrary source of the scientific meter, and is in fact “more honorable” because it is a fraction of the circumference of the earth, rather than part of an arbitrary length of ground.

Measurement is one idea that both Kelvin and Jarry agree on, at least in terms of its importance to both science and ‘pataphysics. Kelvin argues:

…a first essential step in the direction of learning any subject is to find principles of numerical reckoning and methods for practicably measuring some quality connected with it…when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about; but when you cannot measure it…it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely…advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be. (Brown 2)

Kelvin makes an epistemological claim that knowledge is defined by its ability to be measured in numbers, by quantity of some kind, though he does not explain what that quantity might be. Therefore, he argues, knowledge can only belong to a person who can measure quantitatively the matter they want to know and science cannot be understood without knowledge. This is the relationship that Kelvin defines between measurements supporting knowledge that, in turn, is the foundation for science. The problem with this relationship is address by Jarry by Dr. Faustroll’s obsession with measurement lending itself to the satire of Kelvin’s measurement-knowledge-science relationship. As knowledge is based on measurement, and is also the foundations for science, yet it is science that establishes the justification for measurement. This creates a circular argument, where each part relies on the other as justification for its conclusions. Jarry over-extends the relationship between measurement-knowledge-science by focusing on the hyperfine aspects of objects.

One example of this overextension of the relationship is Jarry’s description of Dr. Faustroll at the beginning of the novel. Faustroll is described as being born in “1898 (the 20^th century was (-2) years old)”, when he was sixty-three years old, and that he was “a man of medium height, or to be absolutely accurate, of (8 x 10¹⁰ + 10⁹ + 4 x 10⁸ + 5 x 10⁶) atomic diameters” (183). This exactness in his description is absurd in its accuracy, but by mentioning the preexistence of the 20^th century, Jarry puts Faustroll in the realm of the modern science, the golden age of exact measurement. He was conceived in the 19^th century, but it is the 20^th century that births him, and allows the over-rational absurdity of ‘pataphysics. By focusing on this birth of a century, Jarry is giving the reader a foundation for understanding Faustroll, and though this point in time might seem arbitrary, it is no less unusual than most other forms of scientific measurement. Even Kelvin points that:

“It is interesting, not only in respect to the ultimate philosophy of metrical systems, but also as full of suggestions regarding the properties of matter, to work out in detail the idea of founding the measurements of mass and force on no other foundation than the measurement of length and time” (Brown 3).

In giving not only this exact, albeit absurd, description of Faustroll, along with this unusual date and circumstances of his birth, Jarry is setting the stage for the reader to have a means of measurement to that which we already know. It does not matter that the measurements are absurd or impossible to comprehend; they are still a means for comparison, and a glimpse into the ultra-rational ‘pataphysics.

By making the move from rational to ultra-rational ‘pataphysics is suddenly considered absurdist in its approach to knowledge. Science makes equally absurd moves in its logic, but since the focus is on categories and patterns of information the average person can relate to it, making sense of the explanations given by science to explain the world around them. Kelvin, a widely regarded scientist, gives the example of the infinitesimal satellite, and proceeds to explain why it is a justification for comparison: “These somewhat pedantic words are justified, because “infinitesimal satellite” is nine syllables to express three or four sentences; that is our justification” (Brown 3). By condensing a paragraph down to a few syllables Kelvin is giving a perfect example of science at its best in the defining and categorizing of the even the words on the page. It can be argued that this condensation is just as absurd as any ultra-rationale supplied by a ‘pataphysician such as Dr. Faustroll, no matter how absurd the observations might seem. One standard of arbitrariness cannot be imposed on one form of study, only to be absent from another simply because one explains the world more or less rationally than another without calling into question the ethics of doing so.

Both authors make a claim about the source and value of knowledge, but they do so in very different ways. Kelvin defines knowledge in terms of measurement and quantification, as a support for knowledge, and knowledge, in turn, supports scientific, rational reasoning. Though Jarry also defines knowledge through a form of quantification, it is of a different kind. If ‘pataphysics is the science of the imaginary and particular, then the tools for measurement must also be imaginary or at least based on each and every instance of the particular. In this way, ‘pataphysics might seem arbitrary, but in fact is more rational than science in the rigorousness in which the observations are pursued to explain even the most mundane differences between objects. It may seem absurd to argue against something as simple as the nonexistence of identical objects, but it is also known, even by science, that no two objects in the world are identical. When this is realized, the study of every object and event as its own entity no longer seems absurd, and instead becomes a more rational idea than lumping objects and events into arbitrary categories based on nothing more than their seeming similarities.

Works Cited

Brown, Nathan. "Lord Kelvin, Popular Lectures and Addresses, Vol. 1" Course notes. ENL/STS 164: Writing Science. English/Science and Technology Studies 164. University of California, Davis. February 12, 2009.

Jarry, Alfred. Exploits and Opinions of Doctor Faustroll Pataphysician. Trans. Simon Watson Taylor. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1965.

ENL 164: "Irrational Foundations of a Rational World"

Irrational Foundations of a Rational World

The philosophers Lucretius and Hume were both rationalist philosophers, developing theories based solely on what man can reason within their mind alone, deemphasizing the importance of the senses. In believing that the senses were inferior to reason both philosophers limited themselves to reasonable explanations, using their mind and limiting their senses, to describe not only the world around them, but also to explain the very origins of man, the earth, and indeed the universe. Lucretius’ use of the clinamen as an explanation for the beginning of life is similar to Hume’s explanation of induction, in that both thinkers pose theories that are built on arguments springing from the irrational. Both authors attempt to describe the rational world in a logical way, yet end up resorting to, or realizing that, it is ultimately irrational beginnings that underlie all their rational explanations of reality. Each explanation pulls from the absurd and irrational to describe the origins of the universe, thus ultimately creating a rational world from irrational origins.

Lucretius’ posed that the origins of life were explained by the slight tilt of atoms within a void, which he called the “clinamen,” and it is this swerve that created collisions and binding of atoms that formed all that we know. In the following, Lucretius describes clinamen, and the origins of being:

And a random point in space [the atoms] swerve a little,
Only enough to call it a tilt in motion.
For if atoms did not tend to lean, they would
Plummet like raindrops through the depts of space,
No first collisions born, no blows created,
So nature never could have made a thing. (220-225)

The important word in the above passage is “random,” for it seems completely irrational, and therefore contrary to a rationalist perspective, for an incident leading to all of life to be a consequence of a “random” swerve in the void. This random swerve, and especially his use of the word “random,” implies a lack of rational cause, purpose, or idea that was the force behind the swerve in itself. A rational perspective emphasizes the importance of reason driving all incidents in the world, and only what man can rationalize can be conceived. To propose an origin of the world based on the foundation of a single, irrational, random event contradicts the rest of the theory in its entirety, undermining the foundations before the rest of the arguments are even described.

Lucretius posits, subtly, the argument of the clinamen as just another rational proposition in his argument for atomic structure and formulations. However, unlike Lucretius, Hume does not approach induction as an infallible argument, instead quickly disputing the inductive rationale and posing the limitations of induction at the core of his argument. Hume writes that “The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it” (111). This is Hume’s fundamental flaw of induction, because induction can only be used with a foundation of experience to guide inductive conclusions. Experience cannot dictate the future, explains Hume, because if one did not have experience to dictate the outcome of a cause, then every effect would be subject to extreme doubt. Subsequently, Humans cannot understand the ultimate cause of all being without the ability to conceive of a cause based on an effect. After all, the “effect” that one perceives is, in many cases, entirely different from the cause: “It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance” (117). The ultimate cause, or root cause, cannot be derived from events that occur after the cause, just as future events cannot be predicted from previous.

Experience is weak forms of evidence used explain the relation between cause and the supposed perceived effects. One example of experience being weak evidence is the impossibility that any person can experience the beginnings of the universe, or even conceive of the beginnings of time. Humans have no experiences that can be reasonably used to describe these events, but it is only those experiences that can be used as evidence. This explanation then, is not satisfactory to describe the origins of being, and Hume realizes that these correlations are entirely arbitrary. He writes:

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary…the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary…In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience. (111)

Hume’s induction plays a similar role to Lucretius’ clinamen because, though induction at first seems to be based in rational thought, ultimately there seems to be no rational foundations for it. Induction is based on experience, argues Hume, but experience is limited and cannot be applied to those events that have not, or cannot be experienced. Nor can the cause be drawn from the effect that we perceive, as the above quote describes, as is shown in everyday examples of what we consider to be cause and effect.

The shortcomings of each of the arguments are given different emphasis by each author. Lucretius does not attempt to explain the absurdity of his unexplained postulate. Of course it is not hard to understand why, because it is hard to explain the origins of life without the use of a higher power as a source of creation. Lucretius, however, rules out even that option early in Book Two with the assertion that “not for us and not by gods/was this world made. There’s too much wrong with it” (181-182). His theory of clinamen is as imperfect as the world itself, and it is the imperfect beginning that will birth the imperfect world. Hume realizes this when he writes that “one mistake is the necessary parent of another” (88). It is definitely reasonable for Lucretius to assume an irrational beginning for an irrational world, so the absurd becomes normal in light of this correlation. Hume, in contrast, approaches the limitations of induction confidently, and purposefully, exposing the weaknesses as more evidence of its certainty. He explains:

All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relations of Cause and Effect…And here it is constantly supposed, that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. (109)

Much like Lucretius’ imperfect beginning, induction is another example of imperfect reasoning that seems to harbor the truth within its imperfections, for, even “the most ignorant and stupid peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beasts, improve by experience” (118).

Lucretius resorts to irrationality to prove his argument, and Hume realizes the irrationality of his argument, yet both authors are rationalists attempting to find rationale in the world. This only proves the absurdity of the world around us, and the relevance of a “science of the imaginary” that we find described by ‘pataphysics. Hume seems to realize this when he writes:

Hence we may discover the reason, why no philosopher, who is rational and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which produces any single effect in the universe…The most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of our ignorance. (111-112)

Lucretius also describes a ‘pataphysical idea when we writes:

Nothing’s so very easy to believe
Which at first does not seem incredible;
So too nothing’s so great or wondrous, whose
Wonder will not diminish, little by little. (1025-1028)

We are left with few arguments that give us knowledge, and many questions that take away what we thought we knew. Our foundations in science leave us with more answers than solutions, and the closer we come to the rational, the more irrational we become.

Works Cited

Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. London: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Lucretius. On the Nature of Things: De rerum natura. Trans. Anthony M. Esolen. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.