Jolene Patricia Brown
Dr. M.V. Wedin
PHI 162: Aristotle
27 April 2010
The Problem of Scientific Knowledge through Demonstration
Aristotle claims that scientific knowledge can only arise in the situation that one can demonstrate what they know by presenting the knowledge in a coherent form with specific rules. In this way, his definition of scientific knowledge can be compared to a syllogism: it takes two true premises, argued together, to be able to claim new true information in the conclusion of the argument in the form of the syllogism. Like a syllogism, scientific knowledge consists of true claims that one must understand, and have seen demonstrated, taken together in an argument to be a conclusion that consists of scientific knowledge. He writes:
…it is necessary for demonstrative understanding in particular to depend on things which are true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion… (71b.20)
In the above quote he states four dependencies that must be necessary for understanding of scientific knowledge to occur: a premise must be true, primitive and immediate, more familiar and prior and explanatory. These dependences are important because without them a conclusion would suffer from inconsistency, false claims, and a lack of demonstration that would be necessary for knowledge to be obtained.
Each of the four dependencies represents some form of demonstration in and of itself. The truth dependency, the first one on his list, is that which claims that the premises must be true in order for the conclusion to be true: truth in the premises demonstrates the relationship of truth in the premises to the truth contained in the conclusion, rendering the information in the conclusions as true. The second dependency, primitive and intermediate, refers to the relation of the premises to the conclusion for the information in the premises must precede the information in the conclusion or otherwise entail the conclusion. It would not be possible for a premise that that contains information that is, for instance, chronologically later than the information contained in the conclusion. This dependency demonstrates the relationship of the information in the premises to the information contained in the conclusion and the importance of entailment and logical following as going from premise to conclusion in the course of the argument. The third dependency is more familiar and prior which refers to the relationship between the information and the individual who knows it. One must be familiar with the information contained in the premises in order to use it to make a claim about that information in a new way, such as in a conclusion. “Being prior and more familiar” is that which is “nearer to perception”—something that can been demonstrated to the individual in such a way as to produce knowledge, which can in turn be used as premises to form even more knowledge in the conclusion (72a.1-5). The last dependency is that the premises must be explanatory, meaning that the information contained in the premises must explain the information contained within the conclusion, thereby demonstrating the connection between the relevance of the information in the argument.
The problem with Aristotle’s claim of demonstration as a means of obtaining scientific knowledge is that there is a regress of circularity that occurs in the rigorousness of providing demonstration for all knowledge beginning with the premises that precede the conclusion and extending back to the “first premises.” If Aristotle is correct, there will be no “first claims” that would be found underlying all other claims leading to a conclusion: if there were it would create a problem because either those first claims would not meet the criteria of the dependencies, or one would have to continue their demonstration in a circular argument that would quickly become non-demonstrable. Aristotle makes an argument against the circularity of knowledge by stating that “if demonstration must depend on what is prior and more familiar…it is impossible for the same things at the same time to be prior and posterior to the same things” (72b.25-30). We must remember that being “prior and more familiar” demonstrates the relationship of the information to the individual, and in this way Aristotle is correct: for an argument to be circular, then the individual would both have to know and not know the premises simultaneously in order for the argument to complete itself in a reciprocal fashion. Since the ability to simultaneously know and not know is impossible, the idea that all arguments are circular is not an option.
Instead of pressing for more justification of demonstration as the only means of scientific knowledge, Aristotle then explores the idea that the immediate, or that the dependency between the premises and the conclusion, is not necessarily demonstrable and that instead knowledge at a certain point can be obtained through familiarity by definition (72b.20-25). Aristotle earlier defines “definition” as a “posit…but not a supposition” (72a.20), meaning that unlike a supposition that “assumes either of the parts of a contradiction”—like an assumption—a definition gives information that one must assume but that does not nullify either part of a contradiction. Instead, a definition outlines the meaning of a premise in such a way that it maintains truth, and allows the formation of new information in the conclusion thereby creating new premises for argument: the first “first claims” needed to source scientific knowledge. In claiming that it is possible for some premises, namely those that are immediate, to originate from definitions, Aristotle almost convinces the reader of the definition as a solution to the problem of infinite regress, but even that falls short. The problem with the idea of definition is thus stated:
Since one should both be convinced of and know the object by having a deduction of the sort we call a demonstration, and since this is the case when these things on which the deduction depends are the case, it is necessary not only to be already aware of the primitives…but actually be better aware of them. (72a.25)
By this explanation it is not sufficient that a definition might allow a premise to exist as a primitive, since it is necessary for an individual to be already aware of the premises, but “better aware” of them than the conclusion itself. Since it would be hard to take the definition of a very abstract idea and construct an argument such that the conclusion would not only include information from both definitions, but also create a new idea that is concrete seems impossible. A definition would need to be so well-known by the individual that it would become another premise that would need another demonstration in order to prove all the points of the definition in such a way as to create a conclusion, leading back to the original circular pattern of demonstration needed for scientific knowledge.
Unhappy with the options he presents about the source of knowledge Aristotle instead rejects all accounts, and claims there must be another way for one to achieve knowledge. His options as they stand are to concede to circular reasoning, resort skepticism, or have an infinite explanation that no one would ever be able to conceive. None of these options present a case for scientific knowledge as he would like to accept—in demonstration—so instead of claiming one over the others, he rejects all of them as false, and by doing so implies the option of something unknown even to him: “…hence, since there are few such things in demonstrations, it is evident that it is both empty and impossible to say that demonstration is reciprocal and that because of this there can be demonstration of everything” (73a.15-20). By rejecting all those things he denies are the sources of truth he does not explicitly state what it is that is the source of truth, and instead makes an oblique claim that there is something else that is unknown at this point that is the source. Scientific knowledge, therefore, can be had, but we reach a point in demonstrating the truth of it that knowledge itself remains source less.
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