PHI 102: "Indexical Contextualism as a Solution to Dretske's 'Zoo Problem'"

Indexical Contextualism as a Solution to Dretske’s “Zoo Problem”

Epistemological contexualists argue that the variation of standards in knowledge is what guides an attributor to assign to a subject knowledge or ignorance. One example of this kind of variation in standards is Dretske’s “zoo case,” or an alternative case presented in class by Dr. Mattey of the people in different situations waiting in the airport for a flight. The similarity between both of these cases is that a subject is attributed knowledge in one context, and ignorance in another, with no changes in the situation of the subject, but changes in the context of the attributor. This unusual occurrence creates a lack of argument closure that undermines the original assessment of the attributor leading to a reassessment on the part of the attributor. This lack of closure lends itself to a solution found within indexical contextualism in that it is the context of attributor that confirms the knowledge or ignorance of the subject.

An example of this problem can be formed through a modification of a scenario given by Dr. G.J. Mattey early in the fall 2008 quarter in his epistemology course (PHI 102). In one discussion the question was raised as to whether or not one knows if an old car is a genuine antique, or if it is a car built from a kit to look like an antique, and, he argued, if one has not the training to identify the true antique cars from the new kit cars, then one may not say they “know.” To retool this scenario for the purpose of contextualism, suppose there is a museum of antiquated cars, and subject S is looking at one of the cars on display, and he reads a sign that says the car was built in the year 1945. An attributor A is looking on when S tells A that S knows that the car was built in 1945. S acquired this information, he tells A, by reading the sign on the wall next to the car stating that the car was built in 1945. A has evidence that S knows that p such that the sign was supplied by a reputable source (a museum), and S believes that the car was built during 1945 from some basic understanding of what cars built in that era look like. This casual scenario, context 1 at time 1 (C1 at T1), allows A to draw with some confidence the conclusion that S does, in fact, know that p (the car was built in 1945). This argument can be written:

A attributes knowledge to S at T1 in context C1, given the casual nature of this scenario.

To change the scenario such that the attributor A has a more pressing situation to consider may change the attribution for knowledge to ignorance on the part of subject S. Perhaps a camera crew walks over to A after S claims knowledge and tells him that if S is correct in his knowledge that the car was built in 1945, then A will win a million dollar prize. S is not told about this camera crew, and has no idea there is a contest going on in the museum. In this way, S’s context has not changed: he still believes that the car was built in 1945, and has based this belief on the sign posted in the museum. A’s context has changed with this information and A might then be even more willing to attribute knowledge to S in this scenario given his enthusiasm for winning a substantial prize. A is then told by the camera crew that several of the cars in the museum have been replaced with forgeries of antique cars built from kits, nearly indistinguishable from the antique cars they represent and none of the forgeries were built in 1945. A’s context has changed yet again and A must then decide if he is going to attribute knowledge or ignorance to subject S, and based on his correct choice will be awarded the prize money. A, in this less casual context, may be less likely to attribute knowledge to S simply based on the information that A has that some of the cars in the museum he now knows to be forgeries. Thus, we have the following propositions:

1. A at C1 believes that S knows at C1 (at T1) that the car in question was built in 1945.
2. A at C2 believes that S does not know in C2 that the car in question was not built in a year other than 1945.
3. A at C2 believes that S does not know in C2 that the car in question was built in the year 1945.

Given this change in circumstances, or context, it would seem that A has now the potential to change his original attribution of knowledge to ignorance, and would be justified in doing so, with the intention of winning the prize. Proposition one was correct in the context in which A attributed knowledge to S because he did not have evidence otherwise to attribute ignorance instead. In light of new evidence, A was then justified to attribute ignorance instead of knowledge to S, if he doubts S’s ability to distinguish antique cars from kit cars. This change in context leading to a new attribution is what causes problems in epistemology, which could be solved through indexical contextualism.

The indexical contextualist would argue that the word ‘knows’ is indexical, that is, the word ‘knows’ in one context (C1) is being used in a different way than in another context (C2). This seems to be a good solution to this problem of contextual difference that we see in this problem. If one views the word ‘knows’ as indexical then it makes sense that the word will mean one thing in one context and another thing in another context. As Steven Luper, from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, writes:

According to contexualists, whether it is correct for a judge to attribute knowledge to someone depends on that judge’s context, and the standards of knowledge differ from context to context…What passes for knowledge in ordinary contexts does not qualify for knowledge in contexts where heightened criteria apply (Luper).

It is A’s change in context, in the form of being monetarily inclined to make the correct decision in attributing knowledge or ignorance to subject S, that creates a problem with closure in the argument of whether or not S can be attributed knowledge. Contextualism can salvage closure by allowing the use of the word knows to change from context to context. Returning to our earlier problem, A was not wrong in C1, when he did not have anything at stake by attributing knowledge to S, despite his later evidence stating that some of the cars in the museum were forgeries. Since A did not have that evidence at the time he made the utterance, then at the time he made the utterance his attribution of knowledge was correct.

One solution that seems to work well in cases such as these is Stewart Cohen’s Indexical Contextualism. Cohen’s attempt to solve this problem holds that closure should be kept intact. To quote Mattey’s lecture notes: “Indexicality is certainly one way to generate sentences which express propositions which vary with the context of assertions,” and Mattey goes on to say “one way of expressing the indexical view is to think of ‘knows’ as an elliptical verb that contains a hidden parameter” (2008). For example Cohen argues that the word knows works like other indexical words in the language, for example the word “I.” When the sentence “I am hungry” is uttered by a person, the utterance at the moment it is uttered is true for the person making the utterance (as long as the person is making the utterance in sound mind, and not because the person is suffering from a mental condition or some other mental disturbance). This flexibility allows for the argument to draw closure from the propositions within the argument being evaluated at the same context, and drawing conclusions of knowledge from within those contexts. Mattey discusses how Cohen’s indexical contextualism attempts to salvage closure within his Philosophy 102 web notes:

Cohen holds that closure can be saved by allowing that the sense of ‘knows’ changes from context to context. Within the same context, closure holds, but when the context on the premise and the conclusion operate with a different sense of ‘know’ due to shifting contexts of attribution, there is no failure of closure (2008).

It is important to note the consistency being attained by looking at the antecedents and consequents of an argument in light of the same context, as pointed out in the above quotation. Take, for example, our case earlier, of the attributor and the subject in the car museum. It would be unlikely that any reasonable person would agree that A was incorrect at the time T1 in attributing knowledge to subject S. The evidence that was available to both the subject and to the attributor when he made the attribution of knowledge seemed, at that time and in that context, sufficient enough to warrant the attribution that S had knowledge of the car being built in 1945. It was only after the introduction of new relevant evidence that A’s knowledge attribution is then doubted, and A becomes unlikely to attribute knowledge to S, and even then would only be doing so under the context of a higher-stake situation in his favor (namely, monetary gain).

Based on this and other examples there does not seem to be a “fixed” standard of knowledge. Instead, knowledge is something that is determined by context, and we can accomplish this while still keeping closure intact through Cohen’s explanation of the indexical way that the word ‘knows’ works. Without a fixed standard of knowledge there is a flexibility in the truth and falsehood of sentences, as they are uttered by the subject and the attributor, and the context in which the sentence is uttered.

Works Cited

Luper, Steven, "The Epistemic Closure Principle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = .

Mattey, G.J., “Contemporary Epistemology III: Language.” Version 1.1, November 9, 2008.